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Updates from Inter-Governmental
and Non-Governmental Organizations
Impact of Harmonizing Rules of
Procedure on the African Human
Rights System
In November 2010, the Open Society
Justice Initiative (OSJI), an organization
dedicated to the use of litigation, advocacy, technical assistance, and research to
support international judicial processes,
issued a report by Professors David C.
Baluarte and Christian M. De Vos on
the major regional human rights systems.
From Judgment to Justice: Implementing
International and Regional Human Rights
Decisions examines the implementation of
decisions from the African, European, and
Inter-American regional human rights systems and the United Nations treaty bodies,
and makes recommendations about how
their decisions can be better enforced.
Through its comparative study, the
OSJI report underscores how the regional
systems can draw lessons from one
another’s experiences — for example, on
the differentiation and coordination of a
Commission and a Court. The African
regional human rights system is currently
implementing evolutionary changes to
the interaction of its Commission and
Court, seeking to address procedural and
operational challenges. Created in 1986,
the African Commission on Human and
People’s Rights (Commission) is the
regional body tasked with interpreting the
African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights. However, the decisions of the
Commission are non-binding and have
generally not been implemented by the
responsible states. The more recent 2004
creation of an African Court of Human
and Peoples’ Rights raised initial hopes of
greater accountability. Under the Protocol
that established the Court, the Commission
may refer cases to the Court when a
State Party has failed to comply with
Commission recommendations. Yet, this
has rarely been done and, unfortunately,
procedural impasses and uncertainties have
hindered the Court’s progress.
In 2010, the Commission harmonized
its Rules of Procedure with those of the
Court. These procedures clarify the relationship between the Commission and the

Court, and may help promote regional
accountability. The OSJI report details the
contents of these harmonized Rules, not yet
publicly available, and offers a unique perspective on how the organs in the African
system can coordinate future actions by
implementing their harmonized Rules of
Procedure. The report focuses on Rule
115 (permitting the Commission to refer
cases of state non-compliance to the Court
after nine months), Rule 118 (establishing
that the Court and the Commission shall
meet at least once a year), and Rule 121(1)
(creating a procedure for referral from the
Commission to the Court); however, Rule
121(1) serves as a lynchpin by clarifying
the Commission’s ability to make noncompliance referrals to the African Court.
The harmonization of the referral procedures is one of the most interesting
and anticipated aspects of the new Rules.
Much like the Inter-American system, the
Rules for the African System allow states
the opportunity to first comply with the
Commission’s recommendations and also
filter individual communications through
the Commission before they reach the
Court. Professor Baluarte told the Human
Rights Brief that, “prior to the process
[of] writ[ing] and implement[ing] the
2010 Rules of Procedure, communication
between the Commission and Court was
limited,” but the referral mechanism has
been strengthened by reading the new
Rules 115, 118, and 121(1) together.
The OSJI report is optimistic that the
new referral process will increase accountability. Indeed, this optimism seems well
placed where the Commission and Court
have just made procedural history with the
Commission’s first referral of the Libyan
situation based on widespread and systematic violations of the African Charter. With
the new Rules of Procedure not yet publicly available, it may take time yet for the
full impact of the new procedures to work
its way through the system. However, the
harmonized Rules of Procedure are a significant accomplishment and an important
first step demonstrating a commitment to
protecting human rights and implementing
judicial decisions in the region.
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The Right to Education as a
Legally Enforceable Human Right
March 8, 2011 marked the 100th anniversary of International Women’s Day (IWD),
a holiday to celebrate the economic, political, and social achievements of women. In
a message to commemorate the centennial
anniversary, UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon stated that “in too many countries
and societies, women remain second-class
citizens,” in large part due to their limited
access to education. “Although the gender
gap in education is closing,” Ban Ki-Moon
noted, “there are wide differences within
and across countries, and far too many girls
are still denied schooling, leave prematurely or complete school with few skills
and fewer opportunities.” This statement
supports a widely held understanding that
education is a key driver of economic,
political, and social advancement, and as
such, an essential component of an effort
to achieve greater gender equality.
The legal basis for upholding equal
access to education is widely acknowledged. The right to free, compulsory
primary education for all is recognized
by both the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Education promotes
gender equality by allowing individuals to
access knowledge and methods for improving their lives. Accordingly, education not
only enables women to take advantage of
the same opportunities as men, but also
fosters the understanding that achievement
is not limited by gender.
NGOs support women’s right to education through a variety of legal and nonlegal mechanisms. Litigation is an essential
element of the efforts of many NGOs to
promote the right to education for women.
For instance, the Socio-Economic Rights
and Accountability Project (SERAP)
and Amnesty International brought a
case against the Federal Government of
Nigeria and the Universal Basic Education
Commission (UBEC) of Nigeria before the
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice.
The Court declared that the right to education is a legally enforceable human right.
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NGOs also work to find new solutions
to practical obstacles in the way of women’s access to education. For example,
in Mozambique, where menstruation kept
women and girls from school and jobs
on account of the high costs of sanitary
napkins, NGOs worked to create cheaper
sanitary napkins made from banana leaves,
and petitioned for taxes to be lifted on
women’s hygiene products. The success of
this project compelled the nearby Rwandan
government to pay for pads for schoolgirls.

In January 2011, as the STL prepared
to issue its first sealed indictments, rumors
surfaced that the indictments would implicate Lebanese Hezbollah members in the
Hariri assassination. When Prime Minister
Saad Hariri — the son of the late Hariri —
refused to bow to pressure and withdraw
support for the Tribunal, ten Hezbollahaffiliated ministers dramatically resigned
from the government in protest, leading
to a temporary governmental collapse and
ousting Hariri from power.

Yet, without having begun trials, the STL
has spent upwards of U.S. $70 million over
just the past fiscal year. To compare, the
International Criminal Court spent U.S.
$149 million over the same time period on
investigations and prosecutions in several
situations around the world. The STL’s
response, that these early investigation
costs will be reduced in coming years, is
disputed since the trial process, involving
an unknown number of suspects, may be
long and costly.

Despite 100 years of recognizing
International Women’s Day, women and
girls continue to be discriminated against
in access to education. While international
obligations and treaties exist, requiring
equality between men and women, social
prohibitions and discrimination continue
to limit women’s right to equal education.
NGOs are helping to challenge and change
these practices through legal means and
other creative solutions that ensure that
women and girls will continue to progress
toward equality, especially in education.

In the aftermath, the new Prime Ministerdesignate, Najib Mikati has faced significant pressure from Hezbollah to rescind
Lebanese political support for the STL.
The new Lebanese government, dependent on the participation of its Hezbollah
members, may seek to undermine STL’s
legitimacy or deprive it of the 49 percent
of funding for which the Lebanese government is responsible. The STL has no independent enforcement agency and relies on
the Lebanese authorities for detention and
jailing capabilities; thus, loss of government support could seriously impair the
STL with lengthy execution of warrants
or a failure to “find” suspects. While the
STL was designed by the United Nations
to function independently of Lebanese
politics, the Tribunal may face significant
operational and enforcement problems.

Despite the obstacles and political risk
of continuing the STL, the United Nations
and the STL have repeatedly indicated
that Pre-Trial Judge Daniel Fransen would
begin unsealing the indictments or ordering Lebanon to arrest those indicted. For
the STL to achieve its mandate of bringing
justice to those behind the February 2005
assassinations, it must remain independent from Lebanese politics in conducting
investigations and prosecutions. The United
Nations has expressed a firm commitment
to the STL, but where the future of the
Lebanese government remains uncertain,
so too does the viability of the STL.

Sikina S. Hasham, a L.L.M. candidate at the
American University Washington College of
Law, covers Inter-Governmental and NonGovernmental Organizations for the Human
Rights Brief.

International Justice and National
Stability in Lebanon
In 2005, the government of Lebanon
requested that the United Nations establish
an international tribunal to prosecute those
responsible for the February 14 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri and 22 others that same year.
In response, Security Council Resolution
1757 created the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (STL) and its governing statute in
2007. Unique among the UN-established
international tribunals, the STL applies
only Lebanese law rather than a hybrid of
national and international criminal law or
solely international criminal law. Despite
the fact that its establishment was initially
based upon the Lebanese government’s
request, many in Lebanon, particularly
within the Syrian-backed Hezbollah movement, oppose the STL and say that it is
a foreign influence with too much power
over the domestic judiciary. As a result,
greater Hezbollah influence within the
Lebanese government has raised concerns
that the government will cease cooperating
with the Tribunal.

The STL is a bold experiment for the
United Nations. Unlike the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) or the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which were
set up to investigate and prosecute entire
classes of international crimes committed
throughout a conflict, the STL’s mandate
covers certain specific acts of “terrorism,” as defined in Lebanese domestic law.
Further, in contrast to the ICTY and ICTR,
which originally provided functional judicial authority where there arguably was
none, the STL functions concordantly with
a relatively established Lebanese judiciary.
The STL was initially proposed because
of concerns that the Lebanese court system would be unable to maintain political
independence throughout such high-profile
investigations.
In addition to concerns of redundancy
with the domestic judicial system, the
STL is criticized for its slow progress
and alleged overspending. The STL only
began operations in 2009 and submitted
the first, sealed indictments in early 2011.
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Libyan Crisis Presents Opportunity
for Reforming the UN Human
Rights Council
In 2006, the United Nations Human
Rights Commission, an inter-governmental human rights body under the General
Assembly, was replaced with the Human
Rights Council (UNHRC). The predecessor Commission had struggled with
legitimacy in light of its member states’
alleged human rights violations and a U.S.
boycott under the Bush administration.
The UNHRC was created in hopes that it
would overcome the failings of its predecessor, but it too has been the subject of
substantial criticism. Accusations include
that the Council fails to swiftly respond to
human rights crises and that its own member states such as China, Cuba, and Saudi
Arabia have actively committed human
rights abuses. In 2008, Secretary-General
Ban Ki-Moon challenged the Council to
insist on accountability and to respond to
crises as they unfold. Recent developments
in Libya have finally brought the type of
response the Secretary-General was looking for, possibly indicating a new commitment to addressing tougher issues.
On February 25, 2011, the UNHRC
held a special session to address the grow-
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ing human rights crisis in its member state,
Libya. At the session, the UNHRC passed
Resolution S-15/L.1 by consensus, calling
on Libya to respect human rights and taking the unprecedented step of establishing
a commission of inquiry to investigate allegations of human rights abuses. On March
1, 2011, the General Assembly took further
action by suspending Libya’s membership
in the UNHRC. The UNHRC’s unprecedented establishment of a commission
of inquiry expands on previous countryspecific procedures, which have involved
appointing experts to nations of concern,
such as Burundi and Somalia, to monitor
ongoing human rights abuses. These experts
visit the country and periodically report
findings to the Council. The UNHRC’s
Libya commission is designed to investigate
with an eye toward future accountability,
rather than merely monitoring.
According to Sihasak Phuangketkeow,
president of the UNHRC, the commission
of inquiry will “investigate all alleged violations of human rights, [to] establish the facts
surrounding those alleged violations and,
also, if possible, [to] identify those who are
responsible and consider accountability measures.” Unfortunately, despite its broad investigatory goals, the commission, like previous
country-specific procedures, is dependent on
authorities in Libya for access and cooperation. Although a special session was called on
February 25, 2011, to address the urgency of
the Libya conflict, the commission will not
report its findings to the UNHRC until June
2011, during the Council’s next scheduled
meeting. Further, the UNHRC has previously
struggled with states that do not implement
its recommendations and it is not clear Libya
will respond to the commission of inquiry
and its findings. Despite the shortcomings
of the commission of inquiry, NGOs and
editorials have lauded the commission’s aims
of assessing responsibility and laying the
groundwork for future action as a welcome
change from the less effective mechanisms
of the past.
The commission on Libya is just a first
step and the Council now has an opportunity to implement other positive changes.
Libya’s membership in the UNHRC,
although now suspended, reveals a flaw
in the Council’s membership process.
UNHRC membership is currently open to
all member states. Admission is based on
regional allocation, and although states are
mandated to “take into account the contribution of candidates [for the] promotion

and protection of human rights” prior to
voting, there is no safeguard to prevent the
election of grave human rights violators.
To continue improving its function and
legitimacy as a protector of human rights,
the UNHRC could mandate that the periodic reviews of prospective members be
taken into account during the election process. It could further disqualify those states
with extremely poor human rights records.
An improved vetting process for UNHRC
membership could reward a state’s outstanding contribution to human rights,
rather than relying only on international
support. More stringent admissions could,
however, lead to unintended consequences.
States might be less willing to cooperate
with the UNHRC’s periodic reviews, or be
unwilling to admit to human rights violations if faced with disqualification from
the Council. Furthermore, standards that
are too strict could unintentionally limit
membership to developed countries with
the wealth to implement and effectively
protect human rights. Reformation of the
membership process would be difficult,
but not impossible, and would require the
UNHRC to show awareness of the concerns held by prospective member states.

Sergei Magnitsky Case Highlights
the Office of the Special
Rapporteur on Torture
Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky died
in a Moscow jail on November 16, 2009
after being arrested and jailed by the
Russian government on charges of participation in a tax evasion scheme. Magnitsky
denied these charges, claiming instead that
his detention was a “personal vendetta”
against him for implicating government
officials and the mafia in a U.S. $230 million tax fraud and corruption scandal. After
being held for over eleven months in squalid
conditions and allegedly denied medical
services, Magnitsky was only eight days
away from release when he died. The criminal case against him never reached trial.
REDRESS, an organization that seeks
accountability for those who commit torture, requested UN Special Rapporteur on
Torture Juan E. Mendez to investigate the
suspicious nature of Magnitsky’s death.
REDRESS alleges that the Russian government isolated Magnitsky, prevented him
from meeting with his family or counsel,
and kept him in inhuman conditions in order
to force him to retract his testimony against
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Russian officials. REDRESS asserts that
these conditions amounted to torture as
defined in Article 1 of the Convention
against Torture (CAT), which Russia has
ratified. Under this definition, torture is
the intentional infliction of severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental,
in order to intimidate, coerce, or punish
that individual. REDRESS further claims
that the government violated Article 2(1)
of the CAT because it failed to implement effective measures to prevent acts of
torture in its jurisdiction. Nor has Russia
adequately criminalized torture. In fact,
under the Russian Criminal Code (RCC),
torture does not apply to state officials
acting within their official capacity, which
is a fundamental element of the CAT
definition. REDRESS accordingly chose to
bring the case to the Special Rapporteur in
order to bring international pressure on the
Russian government as Russia conducts its
own investigation.
Special Rapporteur Mendez is taking
the first steps to address this matter, acting
within his mandate under a resolution of
the former UN Human Rights Commission.
Though unable to comment on the inquiry
itself, in his capacity as a visiting law professor at American University Washington
College of Law, Mendez explained,
“Rapporteurships don’t have investigatory
powers . . . . What they do is make inquires to
seek clarification of circumstances.” Mendez
further explained that, according to the
general procedures of the Rapporteurship,
his inquiry involves transmitting summaries
of all credible and reliable torture allegations
to the Russian government. The government
is obligated under Article 13 of the CAT to
investigate the allegations and respond. If
the government responds, further exchanges
may occur. At the conclusion of this dialogue,
Mendez will submit his report to the Human
Rights Council, which will then publish the
information.
For its part, Russia claims to have completed a preliminary investigation, which
found that those responsible for Magnitsky’s
health during his incarceration committed
no wrongdoing, and to be preparing to
issue a formal report on the matter. The
government also stated that any UN inquiries into the matter would violate Russian
legal procedures, although it does not
specify how. Faced with this lack of cooperation, REDRESS could look to the UN
Committee against Torture or the UN
Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture for
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alternative remedies. The Committee has
the power to examine individual complaints
alleging CAT violations. But, according to
Committee guidelines Article 21, it may
only do so if domestic remedies have been
exhausted. This rule may be waived if
domestic remedies are shown to be “unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to bring
effective relief.” If the Russian govern
ment’s internal investigation precludes
judicial remedies, then the Committee will
likely be able to admit and consider the
complaint against Russia. Another option
is for the Committee to raise the incident in
its 2011 annual report or during its periodic
review of Russia’s compliance with the
CAT, likely to occur in 2012.
In the meantime, Magnitsky’s family
may be able to access psychological and
other support services through an NGO
funded by the UN Voluntary Fund for
Victims. The fund offers grants to NGO
programs that directly benefit victims and
their families. The grant money is normally
used to support NGOs that provide psychological, medical, social, legal, and financial
assistance to victims and their families.
In an average year, the fund receives U.S.
$14 million in requests and awards U.S.
$9 million. In fact, the Voluntary Fund
is already one of the major grant funders
of REDRESS, enabling it to do legal and
advocacy work on behalf of people like
the Manitsky family. A Board of Trustees
consults with the Special Rapporteur
on Torture and the Committee against
Torture when reviewing past and new
applications for grants. Thus in recognition of REDRESS’s important work on the
Manitzky case, Mendez could support further funding to the organization. Although
such support services may help survivors
of torture, legal redress itself must come
from the wrongdoing party, in this case
the individuals responsible for Magnitsky’s
death and the Russian state.
Though the Magnitsky family no doubt
faces numerous difficulties in its quest
for redress, the involvement of the UN
Special Rapporteur could potentially help
in highlighting a significant human rights
violation allegedly committed by Russia.
The possibility of further action by the UN
Committee against Torture or organizations
operating with the support of grant funding
from the Voluntary Fund demonstrates that
UN bodies and mechanisms may facilitate
justice and assistance for victims of torture
and their families, even when the violation

is committed by a member of the Security
Council.

UNAMID’s Difficulties in Darfur
Reflect Outdated Mandate
When the fighting in Darfur became
an international concern in June 2004, the
African Union (AU) was first to respond
with military force. It was not until 2007,
after a series of UN Security Council resolutions on Darfur, that the African UnionUnited Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
(UNAMID) was formed by UN Resolution
1769, placing the African Union Force
in Darfur (AMIS) under UN authority.
Resolution 1769 aimed to ensure better
protection for civilians and assist with the
implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA).
UNAMID has struggled to provide
effective aid, often seeming a step behind
real diplomatic and political conditions on
the ground. Already extended three times,
UNAMID’s mandate is set to terminate on
July 31, 2011 if not reauthorized. Although
the DPA is largely outdated, it is unlikely
that a new peace agreement will come out of
ongoing negotiations in Doha by the end of
July. Nevertheless, if extended, UNAMID’s
mandate should be updated to reflect the
DPA’s failure and operation’s primary purpose going forward: to protect civilian and
aid groups in the increasingly violent region.
Widely criticized even in 2006, many
now believe that the DPA has fully collapsed. Minni Minawi’s faction of the
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA-Minawi)
was the only movement of many that
actually signed the DPA, and after five
years the government has failed to implement almost any aspect of the agreement.
Further, SLA-Minawi and the Sudanese
Army resumed fighting in early 2011.
Today, new peace talks are taking place in
Doha, Qatar between the Sudanese government and Darfur rebel groups, including
the well established Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) and the uneasy alliance, Liberation and Justice Movement
(LJM). While promising, the peace talks
are threatened by the chief mediator Djibril
Bassole’s departure, multiple extensions,
and the splintering of the LJM.
While UNAMID still has substantial
military strength — over 22,000 troops,
military observers, and police officers —
the DPA, now effectively defunct, remains
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a central component of the mandate.
Further, human rights organizations have
claimed UNAMID is slow to respond in
protecting civilians and is too deferential to
the wishes of Sudan. UNAMID is required
to inform the government of any military
movement, which in practice operates as a
de facto request for permission. Aid groups
allege such limitations have significantly
hampered the mission’s effectiveness.
In actuality, UNAMID’s mandate would
allow much broader operations. Thus, it
could be argued that it is failing to fulfill its
mandate — reflecting either problems with
implementation, problems with design, or
both. When a peacekeeping force operates
outside its mandate, the UN has in practice
generally followed one of four paths. It can
continue the mission under the existing
mandate, but authorize some flexibility for
the mission to adapt to changing conditions
on the ground and thereby avoid having
to renegotiate the mandate with the host
country. Alternatively, the UN could request
Security Council approval to alter the mandate, or even try to negotiate a new mandate
with the host nation. Finally, the UN could
terminate the mission. Termination of the
mission, however, is the least desirable alternative, since it could further destabilize the
region and lead to the collapse of the current
peace talks in Doha.
If the UN chooses to keep UNAMID
operating under the current mandate, it
would likely do so in order to affirm that the
mission to protect civilians is now its primary
function. UNAMID’s mandate also provides
for it to assist with the implementation of
any future peace agreements, and UNAMID
could thus find itself implementing whatever
new agreement may come out of the current peace talks in Doha. Furthermore, with
its military strength, UNAMID could take
a more active role in preventing violence
against civilians. UNAMID could model
itself after the UN Preventive Deployment
Force (UNPREDEP), the successful mission
in Macedonia, which aggressively patrolled
and combated arms trafficking. Such a role
may, however, make UNAMID more vulnerable to casualties, which have already
reached 81 since the mission’s founding.
Although UNAMID might for this reason
be unwilling to take stronger military action,
this path would be preferable to increased
cooperation with the Sudanese government.
Thus, UNAMID is most likely to continue under the current mandate or one
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adapted slightly to the changing situation.
Whether it can effectively protect civilians
under an ongoing or altered mandate, however, remains an open question.
Thomas Avery, a J.D. Candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers Inter-Governmental and
Non-Governmental Organizations for the
Human Rights Brief.
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